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PREFACE.
We desiredto treat the subject of Fixtures in New York,
exhaustively, but the unexpectedly limited time at our disposal
forced us to abandon that ambitious project.
therefore, set forth on pp.ll-et seq.,

The matter,

is the resilt of inves-

tigations which were confined solely to cases wherein the annexation was made by one having a permanent interest in the
freehold.
Nor have we concerned ourselves with the

consideration

of the specific chattels which have been held to constitute a
part of the realty;
compendiously
progress

but we have endeavored,

the general state

of the law,

of the development of a standard

ment of what we conceive

to

be

rather,
and

test;

to

to present

trace the

with a state-

the present attitude of

the

courts on the subject.
"Speak your latent conviction, and, it
versal sense," said a very wise philosopher,
been over bold

in our commentaries

planation, if not justification,

that sentiment.

Craigielea, May 30, 1894.

shall

be the uni

and if we have

let this fault find its

ex-

in our entire sympathy with

1
INTRODUCTORY AND HISTORICAL.
About the roots of that hoary maxim of antiquity "QuiCquid plantatur solo, solo cedit" there has spring up a veritable wilderness of conflicting decisions made gloomy and noisome by a mischievous undergrowth of obiter dicta.
Replete with ambiguities and inconsistencies; beset at
every point with difficulties of construetion and the danger
of false conclusions;

the path of the venturesome traveller

who has dared these depths, fairly bristles with obstacles,
which, if known to him at the outset, would have caused him to
pause in trembling dismay, hardy and strong and well equipped
for stern encounter though he might be.
The dark shadows of many years
light of logic or equity,

growth deny to him the

and each step reveals

to him more

fully the fact, that the way mmst be long and tedious and bur&*
dened with the weight of many days of patient investigation
and faultless labor if he would clear a path which others may,
in safety, follow.
It

is

vaguely stated by the authiorities that the maxim,

sutpra, upon which is predicated the modern law of fixtures,
is "one of great antiquity;"

and with this unsatisfactory

statement we must content ourselves as the books do not afford
us information as to the precise period when it was formulated.
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The theory, however, of which that maxim is the essence
seems first to find expression in Gaius, where we observe this
provision;
"Moreover, that which any person has built on our land,
even though he have built it for himself, becomes our property
by natural law, because that which is added to the surface,
attaches to the land."

Bk. 2, Sec.

73.

This provision appears to have gained favor with the Romans)for it, with the two sections following, were incorporated
into the Justinian compilations almost verbatim.
At all events,

I. 2. 1. 29.

the maxim in question, and which we cons

ceive to have drawn its life from the above provision, became
in some manner engrafted upon the English law;

and,

being a

very fit concomitant of the Feudal system of land tenure, was
carefully retained as a most wholesome principle, and, until
the reign of Henry VII, was applied with all that unyielding
narrowness of construction of which the English judiciary were
masters.

The downfall of feudalism, however, caused many radical
changes in England, and the courts, despite the accredited
strictness of their adherence to precedent, were forced to
recognize in a measure the changed condition of affairs.

For

3
it

soon became very evident

waste and

that much land would lie

many estates go to rain for lack of tenants,

unless

some step

were taken looking to their protection.
In

deference,

therefore,

to this necessity,

the courts

began a series of adjudications which relaxed the old rile to
a certain extent in

favor of

tenants;

they were permitted to

remove certain species of chattels which they had erected at
their own expense.

Chattels annexed by the tenant for the

purposes of trade or manufacture;

implements used for agricul-

tural purposes and some articles used for domestic ornament
and convenience were admitted to the favor of the courts.
To the conditions under which these tentative efforts
at reform were made,

may,

it

is

submitted,

be traced much of

the confusion which now exists in the law concerning fixtures.
The judiciary must have been swayed by three distinct
influences;
spirit
about

first,

as men,

they must have felt moved,

by the

of improvement which was springing up vigorously all
them,

obtained;

to mitigate the rigorous rules of law which thenm

but on the other hand,

in

their official capacity

they felt the restraining influience of the established
dents;

while lastly,

it

became

early apparent

prece-

that they must

change the rule as to tenants as a matter of national

expedien ,

4
In consequence of this triangular battle which we think
it fair to assume must have waged in the juad.icial mind decisions
appeared whereby the necessary result was obtained, but at the
cost of being so hedged about with a multiplicity of reasons
and subtle distinctions, all looking to reconciliation
some impossible precedent, that subsequent courts find them"
selves at liberty to render decisions of almost any character
and at the same time

find, in the earlier cases, ample author-

ity to sustain them.
It becomes still more apparent, that equitable impulse
little
played
' part in thus practically overturning precedent, when
we consider, that

the comparc.tive liberality which marked the

adjudications of the courts when questions respecting the
right to chattels arose between landlord and tenant and coordinate relations,--found no parallel in their attitude when
the litigants bore to each other a different relation.
And we apprehend, that when we began to accumulate precedents of our own, the rale of "Quicquid plantatur solo,

solo

cedit" was applied with all its inherent inflexibility when the
annexation was made by one having a permanent interest in the
land.

And, indeed, it has been said, that,

"Notwithstanding

the great change which has taken place in the habits and opin-
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ions of society,
mains unaltered;
of law at

this rule
and it

the present

in

favor of the freahold

muist be

regarded as

p.

re-

the general rule

day."

Amos and Ferrard on Fixtures.

still

XXIV.

DISCUSSION OF THE WORD "FIXTURE".

Even a cursory consideration of any portion of the subject of Fixtures wolld naturally seem to involve, primarily,
the careful inquiry as to the exact general definition of that
terrr;

but here again we are met by difficilties of such a

character as to utterly defeat us in our quest;

for we can

fasten upon no precise combination of words sanctioned by aus
thority, the applicetion of which, would in every instance,
determine the status, that is, the l

status, of a specific

article which has been attached to realty.
A discussion in extenso

and a comparison of the multi-

form definitions which disgrace the pages of writer and judge
alike, would be an undertaking of no small magnitude, and we
must, therefore, confine ourselves chiefly to a few commentaries on the word itself as a scientific term.
It appears that the word "fixture" had originally no,
legal significance whatever, but was used in a popular sense,
merely to indicate the physical attacinent of a chattel to some
part of the realty.

The men, however, who loved classifica-

tion and who longed to ad. something to the technical terminology of the times, regarded this peaceful state of a7Vfairs with
great dissatisfaction, and finally plucked the word from its

7

inglorious but harmless obscurity and swung it aloft as a
great acquisition to legal nomenclature;

whence it has spread

the shadows of lamentable confusion over many generations of
sorrowing posterity.
Indeed, the result should have been anticipated for it

Always difficilt as it is to reclaim

was wellnigh inevitable.

a word or phrase from poplfar usage,
more arduous I

the task becomes still

not quite inpossible, when it is sought to im-

pose 'upon such a word a duty entirely foreign to its etfrological characteristics;

and that such was the case with this,

word we have auJple aixthority.
Legal Maxims, p. 417, says;

For example, Broom in his
"In its correct sense the word in-

eludes sch things only of a personal nature as have been annexed to the realty anti wnich may afterward be severed or removed by the party who united them or his personal representatives againat

the will of t~ie freeholder.

Out of this conception of the word very readily grew
the terms "irremovable' and "Removable" fixtures;-- the one
a

e.nselestautologi and the other a hideous solecism, for the

perpetration of wihich there is no logical excuse whatsoever.
Tyler in his work on Fixtures says;

"The word is of an

ambiguous meaning and the writers and courts have used it with

various signif'ioations ;

but the word is always applied to

8
or used permanently

chattels affixed to,
land".

This statement

is

connection with,

in

to offer but small matter for congratulation,

since we unhes-

itatingly assert and endorse the very obvious truth,
use of" the word was and is
introduction into
be regretted.

to us

unquestionably true but seems

entirely unneeessary,

the category of legal

Let us sumppose,

terms is

for example,

that the

and that its
greatly to

that a mortgage

is foreclosed and a dispute arises as to whether or no a cer-e
tain engine shall be sold as part of the realty covered by the.
the question really at issue is;

mortgage;

bear such relations

to, the freehold that it

upon as inseparable therefrom,

or is

it

Does this engine
should be looked

to be regarded as mere

pereonalty entirely without the scope of such mortgage?

Now,

while the distinctive term "fixture" is

ordinarily employed to

designate properly so circumstanced,

must be evident

it

one with a modicum of familiarity with law,
term is

requisite here to aid the court in

the engine is
the courts

that no specific
determining whether

to be considered realty or personalty.

ins4ist%-

upon it,

that,

to any

But

when personal property

is

5

situated that for certain purposes and under certain circum-sh
stances,

t

ay lose its

a distinctive term is
sesses,

because of its

character as such and become realty,

necessary to show that the article pospeculiar situation,

the capacity for

9
being both realty and personalty.
The chief reason that so much difficulty has been experienc-ed by the courts in

this

country in handling the subject

of Fixtures lies in the fact that they insist upon having a
Law of Fixtures.

There is no separate body of law which gov-

erns a class of property known as "fixtures";

the so called

"Law of Fixtures" is concerned entirely with a harassing and
never--answered interrogative;

What constitutes a fixture?

If, to use Broom's definition, a piece of property, personal
in it nature, is a fixture,-then it
applicable to personalty;

is

governed by the rules

but if, on the other hand, it be

hot a fixture, then its legal status is coordinate with that of"
the realty.
To be sure many attempts have been made to produce test;
which,

as matter of law,

woald be infallible;

of the matter lies in the simple statement;

but the truth
that there is not

and cannot be any such thing as the law of fixtures;

because,

by reason of the peculiar nature of the subject

not wit1h-64

in

the

possibilities

late a rule,

of this,

is

nor any other language,

the application of which,

able instance determine what is
realty.

it

or is

will,

in

to formu-

every concei -

not to be regarded as

10
DEFINITION OF "FIXTURE"

IN NEW YOPK.

In this state the word fixture was used in the usual
ambiguous manner in

the earlier cases,

uniformly employed in
mology.

but of late it

a sense which is

in

has been

harLony with its ety-

For example, in Hoyle V. Plattsburgh R. R. Co.

(51 Barb. 46)

we find this expression;

"And if without such

or similar articles the realty would cease to be of' value,

then

they may properly be considered as fixtures and should pass
with it";

and again, in Potter v. Cromwell

the following:,"Under
state as elsewhere,

all the authorities,

40 N.Y. 292)
therefore,

in

this

this mill was a fixture and passes with

the land."
These and similar illustrations which might be adduced in
support of our position,

warrant us,

this definition of a fixture in
article or~structure,

we think,

this state:

originally personal

in

in

formulating

A fixture is an
its

nature,

but

which stands in such relation toward the freehold, as to be.
come,

in-conterriplation

passing with it

of law,

an integral part of it;

and

under a conveyance.

A discussion of the peculiar circumstancea
duce to effect this transmutation in
occupy us presently.

which con-~

the eye of the law will

ii
82,

EFFECT OF 2 R. S.,

SEC.

subd.

6,

4.

Prior to 1830 it was conceded that questions arising
between heir and exec4uor, mortgagor and mortgagee, vendor and
vendee in respect to their rights in chattels, claimed to be a
part of the realty, were governed by precisely the same rules.
But in

the Revised Statutes of that period there appeared a

provision which has been preserved verbatim in
edition, and

which merits some consideration.

The clause referred
the Code of Civil Procedure
follows:

each succeeding

to was last year incorporated
(Sec.

2712 subd.

4)

into

and reads

as

"Things annexed to the freehold, or to any building

for the purpose of trade or manfacture,

and not fixed into

the wall of a house so as to be essential to its

support--ashall

be deemed assets and go to the executor or administrator.
This statute came up for construction for the first
in

1843,

in House v.

House

(10 Paige 158)

wherein Chancellor

Walworth rendered the opinion of the court.
statute was,

plainly,

to adopt

The object of the

the same rule between heir and

executor as prevailed between landlord and tenant;
Chancellor,

time

but the

while recognizing such intent on the part of the

legislature says;
"It

was impossible,

however,

to define in

a short sen-
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tence of three lines what was to be considered a part of the
freehold itself, and what were mere fixtures or things annexed
to the freehold for the purposes of trade or manufacture.
must,

We

therefore, still go back to the conanon law and to the

decisions of the courts for the purpose of ascertaining what is
a substantial part of the freehold, and what is a mere fixture
or thing annexed."
The property in question consisted of water-=Iwheels,
millstones, running gear and bolting apparatus of a flouring
mill;

and, consistently with his opinion, supra, he holds

them to be part of the realty, though they were annexations

I

for the "purposes of trade and manufacture" and despite the fact
that they were not affixed to the wall of the mill so as to
be in any way "essential to its support."
This statute, which the court thus practically refuses
upon
to enforce, must be generally~lookedu,
as inoperative, and the
decision, supra, as final and conclusive as between heir and
executor;

for, curiously enough, no subsequent case nas been

discovered wherein this statute has been urged on behalf of
the executor.

There have been several cases, however, wherein

the statute has been raised in the interest of a vendor or
mortgagor.

In the case of Murdock v. Gifford (l} N,. Y. 281

13

an effort was made in the interest of the mortgagor to have
the statute declared sufficiently elastic
ogous relatiot.

to embrace that anal-

Johnson Ch. J.,,however, decides the case,

on the principle involved in the old. case of Lawton v. Salmon
(1 Hem. Bi. 259. n.);

But while thus tacitly ignoring the

statute so far as it might apply to the situation in hand, yet,
in referring to Chancellor WalwQrth.'

remarks as to the im-

possibility of'giving effect to the statute, he delivers the
following dictum:
"These observations are certainly just;

for it is

quite obvious that the statute does not mean that the executor
shall take everything not essential to the support of the
walls of a building but only such things are spoken of as are
not a constituent part of the freehold, or of the artificial
structure erected on the land.3
But in Ford v. Cobb (20 N. Y. 344) the next case in
which an attenipt was made to extend the scope of the sta-tute,
we find in the opinion of Denio J., this remrark:

"The reason-

ing of the Chancellor in House v. House, ante, is not altogether satisfactory to my mind:

but as the judgment in that case

may be said to have become a rule of property it shodldi not be
disturbed without the greatest consideration, and

certainly not

in a case like the present, which mnay be satisfactorily dis-
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Posed of on other grounds."

But the facts in

that case did

not permit of disposition "on otner grounds" linless the learned
judge intended to imply a refusal to extend theoperation of
the statute.
In

the next case which was that of Voorhees v.

(48 IT. Y. 278)

the court

tainty and says:

boldly throws off the veil of uncer-

"Ti e effect of' this provision is

by Chancellor Walworth in Hoase v. House
cannot,

however,

McGinnis

discussed

'i(ante)..__.

alter the law as to the relation of vendor and

vendee, whatever may be its effect as ,between heir and execu-

tor."
Thus,

while it

is

not at all

certain that the courts

would uphold Chancellor Walworth's ruling as to the statute
the question again came directly before them,.--it may be regardod as absolutely settled,
in

that whatever construction may

future be given to the statute it

will not be extended to

include any other relation than that of heir and executor.

if

15
EFFECT OF CHATTEL MORTGAGES.
The general proposition in
that he is

mortgagee, is;

respect to the rights of a

entitled to have his lien respected

as to all that was realty when he accepted the security and
also as to all

accessions

subject to qualification,
conventions
which is

thereto;

but this proposition is

and the qualifying element;

lies in

between the mortgagor and the vendor of pasonaljty

to be so annexed #o

the freehold as to become,uner

ordinary rules of lawa part thereof and consequently subject
to a mortgage covering the realty.

Such conventions, generally

take the form of chattel mortgages,

and it

may be here re-

marked that the purchaser of the realty, when the transaction
occurs after the execution of the chattel mortgage stands in
the same relati~vie position as a mortgagee of the realty, and
may therefore be considered at the same time.
In an action between a chattel mortgagee and a subse"
quent purchaser of the realty, salt kettles, set in stone
arches so that they could not be removed with tearing out certamn brick work,
tels

(Ford v.

were held to retain their character as chat-.

Cobb,

ante).

This case seems

to be authority

for the general proposition that a chattel mortgage given
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prior to the execution of a mortgage or deed of the realty,
acts as a conservator of the personal character of the chattels covered thereby,
is

pt

upon his inquiry as to what he is

chase noney or what
it

and the pirchaser or possible mortgagee

was intimated in

security he is

to get for his pur-

to obtain for his loan;

for

a dictum that the annexation was stfficient

to cause the kettles to be declared fixtures had it not been
for the intervention of" the chattel mortgage.
But this very broad and uweeping proposition is
very properly,
in

made the subject of qualification,

the caseybefore

citedof

Voorhees v.

also,

as appears

McGinnis.

That case

would, at first blush, seem to be a tacit overruling of Ford
v. Cobb;

but upon more careful reading and a comparison with

the later cases,

we assame to say,

that it

merely modifies the

rule there laid down.
The property in dispute in Vorhees v. McGinnis consisted
of an engine and certain boilers;

it was shown that

there was

no defined mental intent to make the annexation permanent but
it

was also true that the removal of the engine and boilers

could not be accomplished without serious damage to the free-.
hold.

The court,

Ford v.

Cobb and decided that the engine and boilers became a

per Hunt C.,

entirely ignored the case of
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part of the realty despite the existence of the chattel mortand the learned judge adduces a hypothetical

gage;

case to

illustrate the danger to be feared from a contrary holding. He
says,

in substance:

paid in

fUll and it

If

a mason puts brick

then transpires

into a house and is

that the maker of the brick

held a chattel mortgage thereon executed by the mason, it
would be manifestly unjust to allow the cnattel mortgagee to
remove the brick;

he is

put to his action against the party

who converted the brick into realty.
It will be observed that the hypothetical case presents
a situation where the removal of the fixtures would result in
more damage to the freehold than wo-ld such removal in
case at bar;

and we therefore

construe

it

ed exhibition of the reasoning whereby

the

to be an exaggerat-

the decision in

that

case was reached.

The peculiar nature,

ical illustration;

the fact that the case of Ford v. Cobb is

entirely ignored;

then,

of this hypothet-

and the further fact that both cases are

recognized in later adjudications with no hint

that they are

considered as conflicting, lead us to the conclusion that a
chattel mortgage avails it
his rights under it
Indeed,

holder

2j

when the exercise of

will not seriously injure the freehold.

the late case of Tyson v.

Post (108 N. Y. 218)

goes

18
still

further and maintains that "by convention

the land may reimpress

the owner of

the character of personalty on chattel

which by annexation to the land,
ing to the ordinary rale of law;

have become fixtures accordprovided only that they have

not been so incorporated as to lose their identity and the reconversion does not interfere with the rights of creditors or
third persons."
Finally we would thus suirimarize the law in this connoction:

A mortgagee is entitled to all that was realty at

the time of the execution of a mortgage but as to subsequent
accessions he has no rights, if there exists between the parties an agreement that a lien shall attach for their purchase
price;

but such lien will be of no avail,

whatever,

removal of" such accession would injure the freehold;

if

the

and a

subsequent purchaier would of course, as regards this last
point, stand in the same position as the mortgagee.

19
DEVELOPMENT OF STANDARD TEST.

The first case of note in this state which deals with
the subject of fixtures is that of Walker v. Sherman (20 Wend.
686)'

wherein Cowen, J.,

in rendering the opinion of the court

entered into an elaborate examination and discussAon of all
the old cases of importance.

Though that litigation grew out

of a partition between tenants in common, the same principles
were applied as though the litigants had been vendor and venua
dee.
This case decided that certain machinery in a woolen
factory was personalty, because it was not annexed to the realty.

This decision entirely ignores a fact which was estab-A

lished in evidence and which should have caused an opposite
conclusion to be reached;

this important fact was, that the

machinery in question had passed from one owner of the factory
to another, for eleven years.

But the learned judge says:

"I admit that some of the cases are quite too strict against
the purchaser bt as far as I nave looked into them, and I have
examined a good many, both English and American, the.y are almost uniformly hostile to the idea of mere loose, movable machinery, even where it the main agent or principal thing in
prosecuting the business to which a freehold property is

20
adapted, being considered as part of that freehold for any
purpose.

To make it a fixtute, itmust not only be essential

to the business of the erection, but it must attached to it
in some way."

'And he concludes his brilliantly logical and

equitable disquisition by saying:

*The general importante of

the rule, however, which goes upon corporal annexation is so
great that more evil will result from frittering it away by
exceptions, than can arise from the hardship of

adhering to

it in particular cases."It certainly does seem surprising that this learned
judge shonld have deemed it fitting to cling to a rule merely
for the sake of expediency, when a previous case had shown him
that the application of that identical rule might not only
lead to results that were inequitable and illogical;

but that

it might also produce a state of affairs positivaly absurd. The
case referred to is that of Miller v. Plumb

(6 Cowen 665),

where it was held that certain potash kettles actually attached
to the freehold were a part thereof, while certain other kettles quite as necessary in

he prosecution of the business

were held to be personalty because they merely stood in the
building without being in any way attached thereto.
During the twenty-five years immnediately succeeding the

21
case of Walker v.

Sherman,

there crept into the cases certain

dicta which could not be reconciled with its doctrine;

for

example, it was suggested that "intention enters into and makes
an element of each case;"
"circumstances

and it

was further said,

that the

were to be taken into account to show whether

the erections were made for the permanent improvement of the
freehold

or for the temporary purposes of trade."

Furthermore
Walker v.
where it

it

became.

apparent that the doctrine of

Sherman was not being applied by the courts except
seemed that there was no escapjitg it;

was possible they avoided its
their decisions
In

wherever it

corrosive influence and based

on the old cases.

Bishop v.

Bishop,

(11 N. Y.

123)

decided in

1854,

the plaintiff, as executrix, sold to the defendant certain hop
poles which were piled up on the farm and took his note.

After.

ward the farm was sold under a mortgage while the poles were
still on the land.

In an action on the note the defendant

set up that the poles were fixtures and that there was a consequent failure of consideration;
ing:

"The root of the hop is

series of years.
of the real estate,

and the court so held;

perennial,

say-

continuing for a

That the hop roots would pass to a purchaser
that can be no doubt.

The hop pole is

22
indispensable

to the cultivation of the crop,

Etc.,

continuing the reasoning on the lines laid down in
of Lawton v.

Salmon,

ante.

Denio and Jonson JJ.,

etc."
the old case
dissented

on the ground that there snould be an actual annexation.
This decision plainly indicates
faction with the old rule requiring

the growing dissatis-

an actual annexation and

shows a disposition to view the matter more in the light of
equity and common sense.
before the court,

it

And in

placed itself

the next

aase which came

on record with reference

to this point in such a manner as to render exceedingly un*likely a future recurrence

to that old fallacy as a final test.

The case was that of Snedeker v. Warring (12 N. Y. 170)
and the chief point at issue was whether a certain granite
statue, weighing three or four tons, but held in its place
merely by its own weight,

should be considered a fixture.

that it should be so regarded.
ion,

and in

Parker,

those colossal erections

"it

would be absurd to claim that

(the sphinxes) were still unadminis-

tered personal assets of the Ptolen-.es

continues,

rendered the opin%-

discussing the propriety of requiring an actual

annexation, remarks that,

are held in

J.,

Held

place by their own weight."

,

merely because they
"I

apprehend"

he

"the question whether the pyramids of Egypt or

Cleopatra's Needle are real or personal property does not
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depend upon an inquiry by the antiquarian whether they were
originally made to adhere to their fo-andations with wafers,
or sealing-wax, or a handful of cement."

It may be noted, in

passing, that this is the first case which appears

in the

books wherein a similar litigation was carried on over a statue .
The next important case which demands our attention in
this connection is Potter v. Cromwell (40 N. Y.

292)

amd is

valuable to us chiefly because it is the first case to state
in

definite form the tests which are now applied in deter-

mining the status of a chattel when used in conjunction with
realty.

For the criterion of a fixture therein set forth the

court is indebted to the case of Teaff v. Hewitt

(1 McCook

(Ohio) 511).That criterion was accepted as satisfactory in
Vorhees v. McGinnis, ante, and again in McRea v. Bank;

and,

in fact, none of the later cases appear inclined to cavil at
it or to depart from it in any way.

This criterion requires

the union of three elements in a chattel, in order that it may
constitute a fixture:
(1)

Permanency of annexation;

(2)

Adaptability;

(3) Inten-.

tion of the parties.
It~is not necessary that there should be an actual annex
ation;

mere juxtaposition will suffice, and the courts would
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more clearly present their real meaning if

they would use the

word "accession" in place of "annexation".
The intention of the party is
first two elements,
an end.

the prime test,

and the

supra, are required merely as a means to

That is, if the conditions present are such as to

indicate by inference an intent to make the chattel a permas
nent accession--and the adaptability of the chattel would be
one of the conditions to be considered--then no other evidende
need be forthcoming to make the article a fixture.

And in

support of this view we adduce the following words of Rappallo
J.,

in McRea v.

may,

it

is

true,

Bank (66 N. Y. 489):
in

"The mode of annexation

the absence of other proof of intent ,be

controlling."

Thus, the courts of this state, have lifted themselves
completely out of the depths into whicht hey were thrust by
the iniquitous doctrine promulgated in Walker v. Sherman, and
have advanced step by step up the precipitous Mountain of Reform;

not blazoning forth their progress as each foot crept

noislessly past its

mate,

lest their intention be noted and

defeated by the intervention of that conscienceless
improvement,

"Stare aecisis"

the less firmly in

;

enemy of

but holding themselves none

each new position they g

reasonS for
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the hope that they may soon reach the summit.

And when that

happy end is compassed they will have ceased to constitute
themselves judges, both of the law and" of the facts, and will
have made the question of fixtures one of fact alone for the
jury under instructions from the court which shall embody the
three elements, the presence of which they now deem to constiatute the proper test.

